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On November 18–19, 1999, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago held the final
in a series of three conferences dedi-
cated to education reform. Cospon-
sored with the Civic Committee of the
Commercial Club of Chicago and
the Consortium on Chicago School
Research, the conference focused on
reform in large urban school districts.
In his opening remarks, William C.
(Curt) Hunter, Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago, said that the quality of
urban school systems matters greatly
because so many of the nation’s future
citizens and workers attend these
schools. Efforts to improve public
school quality are key in reviving city
economies by attracting families back
to the center.
Chicago, Baltimore, Washington,
Hartford, Cleveland, Boston, and
Detroit have experimented with may-
oral assumption of school responsibil-
ities in recent years, with mixed results.
Paul Hill, University of Washington,
argued that improvements cannot be
realized by simply exchanging one
group of decisionmakers for another.
He suggested three strategies for re-
form: strong performance incentives
for staff and institutions, substantial
investment in both school and teacher
capacity, and giving schools freedom
to experiment with new models for
teaching and organization. With regard
to governance, it is essential to reward
good schools, while closing poorly
performing ones. Hill envisions a
CEO-style superintendent managing a
portfolio of strong, distinctive schools.
In such a system, a superintendent
and school board would enter into
performance contracts with indepen-
dent organizations—groups of teachers
and parents, teacher cooperatives
and unions, nonprofit human service
organizations, colleges and universi-
ties, civic groups, and for-profit con-
tractors. Such an approach develops
the educational resources of an entire
urban community, including new and
existing independently operated
schools, and makes them available to
all the city’s children. Lessons from
the many political and managerial
failures to date do not lead Hill to
believe that fundamental reform will
be quick or easy. He concluded that
civic and business leaders must drive
education reform by creating new
public-private institutions to raise
the quality of school systems.
Chicago reforms
Anthony Bryk, Consortium on Chicago
School Research, discussed the begin-
nings of Chicago’s school reforms in
1988 with its move to decentralize
decisionmaking to the local school
level. Principals were granted auton-
omy to better manage their schools
through more control of personnel
decisions. Councils of parents and
teachers gained partial control of the
school budget and improvement
plans along with the power to hire
and fire school principals. Such de-
centralization was intended to spur
incentives and initiative while also
providing greater accountability to
the primary customers of school ser-
vices. One-third of the schools have
benefited from effective leadership
and strong community involvement.
Another one-third have made some
progress. The remaining one-third
have not benefited. Reform efforts in
Chicago expanded in 1995 with may-
oral assumption of responsibility for
the school system. A CEO was appoint-
ed along with a five-member school
board. Then, noticeable changes
began to take root. Mandated exams
and performance standards imposed
higher accountability on principals,
students, and schools and led to the
expansion of instructional time and
greater resources for pre-kindergarten
and summer school. Some schools
were put on probation with close eval-
uation and assistance. Some were re-
constituted. Formalized instructional
techniques and curricula were encour-
aged. At the same time, the Chicago
public schools (CPS) system has ex-
panded the availability of magnet
schools with a specialized curriculum.
Fiscal stability continues to be an im-
portant ingredient to success. Fiscal
balance has generally been achieved
due to better financial management
and to the healthy economy of the
1990s. As part of the 1990s reforms,
stable labor agreements have been
struck. Jim Franczek, Franczek Sullivan
P.C., noted that the reforms in 1995
saw the simplification of labor agree-
ments, which served to streamline the
bargaining process. Before that, the
city had to negotiate with 29 unions;
at present there are only three. In ad-
dition, successful negotiations have
resulted in collective bargaining
agreements in effect for essentially
eight years.
Among the boldest of recent reforms,
in 1996 the CPS began a new initia-
tive aimed at ending social promo-
tion. To be promoted to the next
grade, students must achieve a mini-
mum score in reading and mathemat-
ics on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills
(ITBS). Students who do not meet
the criteria are required to participate
in a special summer school program,
Summer Bridge, and then be retested
at the end of the summer. Students
who do not achieve the minimum
score after the program are either re-
tained in their grade or sent to alter-
native schools called Transition Centers
if they are age 15. The policy aims to
focus teacher attention on students
who are not mastering the material.
Students who are at risk are given ex-
tended instructional time during theschool year through Lighthouse, an
extended after-school program that
provides schools with funds to extend
the school day and a centrally devel-
oped curriculum focused on reading
and mathematics. Critics of the policy
voice concern that grade retention
has not been shown to lead to higher
achievement and many educators frown
upon using a one-time test score to
make promotional decisions. The Chi-
cago policy, however, does allow some
discretion on the criteria by which a
student is promoted or retained.
Melissa Roderick, Chicago Consortium
on School Research, shared the results
of her evaluation of social promotion
policy. The study compares the progress
of students who faced the promotional
test cutoffs in 1997 and 1998 with that
of a group of students two years earlier,
before the policy was in place. The
main findings are: 1) impressive in-
creases in the proportion of students
who meet the test-score cutoff for pro-
motions; 2) mixed results on whether
getting students up to a test-score cut-
off one year allows them to do better
the next year; 3) retained students
continue to struggle; 4) much more
positive results overall for sixth and
eighth graders than for third graders;
and 5) administrative issues shape
students’ experiences under the policy.
Has student performance improved
across the system? John Easton, Chicago
Consortium on School Research,
gathered ITBS test score gains for
students ordinarily in third through
eighth grade for each year from 1994
through 1999. Since the “form” (or
version) of the test changes from year
to year, it is not always possible to make
meaningful comparisons. However,
the gains in years 1994 and 1996 could
be meaningfully compared, as could
the gains in 1997 and 1999. The sta-
tistics indicate that, for both math and
reading, achievement gains by Chicago
students increased from 1994 to 1996.
However, while gains from 1997 to
1999 suggest that Chicago students
were, on average, gaining more than
one year in achievement in both 1997
and 1999, the gains have tended to
flatten rather than accelerate since
1997. These findings appear to con-
firm the view that Chicago students
in younger grades have experienced
improved learning gains. However,
increasing gains may require ever
more diligent efforts and reforms.
Meanwhile, high school students
have not fared so well. G. Alfred Hess,
Northwestern University, noted that
only around 60% of students graduate
from high schools in Chicago; and
from 1990 to 1996, there were in-
creased dropouts and fewer students
capable of reading at the national level.
Of course, the successes at the lower
grades will increasingly feed into high
school outcomes. Moreover, the 1995
reform legislation in Chicago public
schools allowed some long-awaited
improvements. A $3 billion plus reha-
bilitation and new construction pro-
gram greatly improved school facilities.
In 1996, CPS CEO Paul Vallas con-
vened a task force to create a new high
school design. The task force recom-
mended that: schools enhance their
“personalism” (getting to know stu-
dents and their needs better) and up-
grade learning standards. To enhance
personalism, schools are to conduct
advisories (groups of 15 students and
a teacher focused on students’ social
character development) and to recon-
figure their programs for freshman
and sophomores into “junior acade-
mies,” where students would be bet-
ter known. Heightened academic
focus will result from higher gradua-
tion standards, which includes putting
every student in a core curriculum of
courses that carry graduation credit
(eliminating most remedial courses),
and from accountability and support
measures, such as putting schools on
probation and reconstituting schools.
High schools where only 15% of stu-
dents read at the national level were
placed on probation and some were
ultimately reconstituted. Also, learn-
ing standards were set in place at each
school and course outlines and sample
lesson plans were developed. As for
closer accountability, standardized ex-
ams are currently being developed
that will help establish performance
standards for students and schools.
Helped along by a better performing
generation of entering students, high
school reform measures may have
borne fruit in recent years. Gradua-
tion rates have risen and so have the
rates of students achieving national
performance levels in reading and
math. Hess noted that one-third of
high schools on the probation list in
1996 have made performance gains.
Increased accountability has resulted
in more effective principals, higher
teacher morale, and a higher academic
level of entering students. Hess did
have concerns over the seemingly un-
imaginative pedagogic approaches of
many high school teachers (e.g., class-
room presentation involving little
other than restatement of facts and
rote practice of processes). He pro-
posed that CPS should recruit more
academically prepared teachers and
install additional magnet programs.
Martin Koldyke, Frontenac Co., raised
a warning flag about backsliding on
some of the strong sanction-oriented
reforms that have been initiated in
Chicago. He argued that schools re-
quire a strong centralized management
style, which allows intervention within
nonperforming institutions. Koldyke
cautioned that failure to adopt an effec-
tive centralized system of management
will result in worsening schools and
adoption of other reforms such as
vouchers and charter schools.
Partnering approaches
Mark Smylie, Karin Sconzert, and
Penny Sebring, Consortium on Chicago
School Research, discussed partner-
ships funded by Annenberg Chal-
lenge grants beginning in 1995. The
Annenberg Foundation provided
$49.2 million, which was matched by
$100 million in local funds. The chal-
lenge supports 45 implementation
networks covering 42% of the students
in the CPS. The external partners
consist of businesses, neighborhood
organizations, foundations, colleges
and universities, arts and cultural in-
stitutions, activist and reform groups,
regional education organizations, and
teacher organizations. Information was
gathered from an external partner and
two or three schools in each of ten
networks. External partners are most
effective in improving schools when
they bring strong expertise, adequate
fiscal resources, deep understanding,
and the ability to promote collabora-
tion among schools in a network. More
successful external partners also
focus on comprehensive school
development, including learningMichael H. Moskow, President; William C. Hunter,
Senior Vice President and Director of Research;
Douglas Evanoff, Vice President, financial studies;
Charles Evans, Vice President, macroeconomic
policy research; Daniel Sullivan, Vice President,
microeconomic policy research;  William Testa, Vice
President, regional programs and economics editor;
Helen O’D. Koshy, Editor.
Chicago Fed Letter is published monthly by the
Research Department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago.  The views expressed are the
authors’ and are not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal
Reserve System. Articles may be reprinted if the
source is credited and the Research Department
is provided with copies of the reprints.
Chicago Fed Letter is available without charge
from the Public Information Center, Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago, P.O. Box 834,
Chicago, Illinois 60690-0834, tel. 312-322-5111 or
fax 312-322-5515. Chicago Fed Letter  and other
Bank publications are available on the World
Wide Web at http://www.frbchi.org.
ISSN 0895-0164
climate, instruction, professional
community, school leadership, and
parent and community involvement.
Janet Froetscher shared her experi-
ence from the Financial Research and
Advisory Committee (FRAC), a non-
profit organization whose mission is
to create plans and implementation
actions for financial and management
improvements in Chicago area govern-
ment agencies. FRAC is fully funded
by the Civic Committee of the Commer-
cial Club of Chicago, representing the
leaders of some of the region’s largest
organizations and corporations. FRAC
became involved with the CPS in 1990
at the request of Mayor Daley. In 1994,
FRAC and the Civic Committee
joined forces with City Hall, the CPS,
other business groups, state govern-
ment, foundations, and community
groups to help draft and pass legisla-
tion that gave the mayor greater control
over the schools. Among other things,
the legislation allowed for outsourc-
ing of services and greater flexibility
in using funds. Throughout the sub-
sequent reform efforts of the 1990s,
FRAC has assisted with financial re-
forms and business practices. For exam-
ple, in a joint venture with the Chicago
Principals Association and others,
FRAC spearheaded an effort to guide
aspiring principals in creating devel-
opment plans, learning necessary
skills, and obtaining a position. FRAC
also offers local school councils hands-
on help in choosing a principal.
In contrast to the direction taken by
civic and business communities in
Chicago, some prominent Milwaukee
leaders have partnered to support pri-
vate sector delivery of education. Dan
McKinley, Partners Advancing Values
in Education (PAVE), noted that much
like Chicago, Milwaukee’s public
school performance was dismal: Few-
er than 50% of public school students
made it to graduation and the average
performance of graduates was marked
(generously) at a D+ or C– grade. To
turn things around, the business com-
munity assumed a leadership role
in education reform. The Greater
Milwaukee Committee formed a rela-
tionship with public schools called
The Education Trust, which initially
focused on “supply side” solutions,
such as business/school partnerships,
mentoring, and teacher awards. The
results were less than encouraging.
Then these business leaders became
involved with PAVE—an organization
that was founded to support Catholic
schools but soon evolved into an inde-
pendent organization committed to
a “demand-side” solution. PAVE
turned its attention to poor families
seeking educational opportunities
in alternative K–12 schools (110 inde-
pendent and religious schools serve
approximately 20% of all students in
Milwaukee). After seven years, 18,000
scholarships, and $22 million invested
by 1,300 donors, the results are re-
markable: 86% of PAVE students
continue their education in colleges
and technical schools and 97% of
PAVE parents are involved signifi-
cantly in the schools they have chosen.
McKinley said that support for choice-
based education has become wide-
spread, including the Milwaukee
public schools system, which has now
made parental school choice its high-
est priority. Moreover, in 1999 a reform
slate of new school board candidates
won on a platform of “strong public
schools and full parental choice.”
McKinley believes that Milwaukee
leaders came to recognize that real
educational reform must harness the
natural interest of parents to make
good choices for their children.
Detroit public schools
The public school system in Detroit
was one of the world’s finest in the
1920s. In the late 1990s test scores in
core subjects were far below state
and national norms, with graduation
rates between 53% and 56%. Jeffrey
Mirel, Emory University, explained
that the Great Depression and the
demands of World War II began the
downward spiral of the school system
by fracturing the political base of the
system, devastating its finances, and
severely constraining its budgetary
options. In turn, these strains intro-
duced powerful political forces op-
posed to increasing school taxes, an
increasingly strong teachers union,
and the evisceration of academic
standards. Massive unemployment
during the 1930s and 1940s led to
an influx of less-educated students.
Educators mistakenly believed that
these students were incapable of
handling rigorous academic or
vocational courses and tracked them
into less demanding programs. High
schools became “warehouses,” where
young people could bide their time
until they could enter the work force.
A school reform bill applying only to
Detroit was passed in March 1999.
Despite Michigan’s long tradition of
local control, David Adamany, Detroit
Public Schools, said that conditions in
1999 were ripe for a change in control
and responsibility. The state had re-
cently taken almost full responsibility
for funding schools, adopting a sales
tax to replace most local school monies.
The legislation created a seven-mem-
ber school reform board, six appointed
by the mayor plus the state superinten-
dent of public instruction. The CEO,
although serving at the pleasure of the
board, had full legal authority to con-
duct the district’s business. However,
the legislation did not expand the au-
thority of the district’s management or
board. Unlike in Chicago, for example,
the Detroit reform did not curtail the
power of powerful school unions,
thereby leaving the school district to
bargain not only compensation but also
educational and other policy issues.
The new administration set out to
renegotiate all 18 union contracts,
and in late 1999 the board approved
a plan that called for stronger curricu-
lum standards in core subjects, class
size reduction to 17 in grades K to























































































































































































































adoption of test-score measures of
progress for each school, and closure
of failing schools. Addressing other
issues, more than 700 certified teachers
were recruited. Almost $90 million of
emergency repairs to 6,000 classrooms
and 2,000 lavatories were undertaken
in a 65-day construction period. And
books and supplies, often in short
supply, were delivered to schools in
late summer.
Peter Eisinger, Wayne State University,
raised several concerns about the
mayoral takeover within Detroit Pub-
lic Schools. One issue has to do with
the legitimacy of a reform that abro-
gates the authority of an elected school
board and replaces it with an appoint-
ed body with no direct accountability
to the voters or parents. Eisinger ar-
gued that the reform will be hard
pressed to succeed without strong
outreach efforts to the community. A
second issue is the inescapable racial
element in a reform that involves the
abrogation of a largely black elected
school board by an overwhelmingly
white state legislature. One immediate
effect of the racial tension in Detroit,
for example, is to make it very hard
for a black CEO or union leader to
embrace the reform. Another problem
specific to Detroit is the pursuit of this
reform in a city with a strong union
culture. If the existence of a strong
union and mayoral takeover are in-
compatible, then reform is doomed,
for in the end, it is the teachers in the
classroom who have to be the instru-
ments of reform.
Michigan’s recent financial reforms
may be easing some strains on Detroit
schools. Douglas Drake, Wayne State
University, discussed the importance
of Michigan’s 1994 “Proposal A,” which
has had a material impact on the finan-
cial options for Detroit and other
Michigan school districts. Proposal A
was a voter approved constitutional
amendment that was primarily driven
by the need for property tax relief,
with improvements in school financing
equity an important secondary concern.
Proposal A changed Michigan’s sys-
tem of education funding from a pow-
er equalizing formula to a foundation
grant. It significantly raised the bottom
tier of districts in per pupil revenues
and included very tight limitations
on local operating mills, slowing the
growth of the highest spending dis-
tricts. The result was a change in the
overall financing of the system from
one that was 35% state in origin to
80% state. For Detroit, revenues and
spending increases have been signifi-
cant but not phenomenal. However,
it has significantly reduced one of the
strains on redevelopment and reinvest-
ment in Detroit as property tax rates
(for schools) have fallen dramatically.
Conclusion
Central city school systems, such as
those in the Midwest, are understand-
ably the focal point for reform. It is here
that the challenges are greatest and the
obstacles the most intractable. Students
are commonly underprivileged in their
family background and neighborhood
environments. Schools may lack the re-
sources to serve their very great needs,
and school governance and reform are
impeded by antiquated political design
and entrenched special interests. The
most promising reform programs are at-
tempting to build workable coalitions
and partnerships involving government,
neighborhoods, nonprofit foundations,
teacher and principal associations, and
the business community.
—William A. Testa





Note: Detailed summaries of presentations,
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section under Conferences on Midwest
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